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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, an increasing amount of public concern 
has focused on the ills of a method of natural gas drilling called 
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hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking.”1  Fracking has been linked to 
contamination of drinking water, earthquakes, rapid deterioration of 
public roads, and air pollution.2  The safety of drinking water has 
been a particularly prevalent topic.  Although only two 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) studies have linked 
fracking to the contamination of water wells,3 there have been several 
incidents in which safety precautions have failed to prevent the 
escape of natural gas into the water aquifer,4 and several studies have 
shown a correlation between drilling activity and high methane levels 
in nearby water wells.5 
On the other hand, states are always in need of jobs, and natural 
gas jobs are particularly attractive in a worsening economy.6  Studies 
have shown that natural gas has not only been a boon to employment 
in the core drilling industry, but also to employment in ancillary 
 
 1. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Sitting Atop Huge Gas Reserve, Md. Debates 
Fracking, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2011, at A5; Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, and 
Concern There May Be More, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2011, at A13.  These ills are 
showcased in the movie Gasland, where a farmer in Dimock, PA with a fracking well 
on his land is able to light his water on fire due to the high percentage of methane 
that has seeped into his water well. GASLAND (HBO Documentary Films 2010). 
 2. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHALE GAS 
PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE 90-DAY REPORT—AUG. 18, 2011, at 3, 41 n.25 (2011); 
see also AUSTIN HOLLAND, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EXAMINATION OF 
POSSIBLY INDUCED SEISMICITY FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE EOLA FIELD, 
GARVIN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA 1 (2011), available at http://thinkprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Fracking-quake.pdf. 
 3. Dominic C. DiGiulio et al., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVESTIGATION OF 
GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING, at xi (2011), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/wy/pavillion/EPA_ReportOn 
Pavillion_Dec-8-2011.pdf; 1 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF WASTES FROM THE 
EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, 
AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY (1987).  Negotiated settlements regarding potential 
drinking water contamination usually contain a confidentiality clause barring 
landowners from publicly producing evidence of contamination, thus significantly 
limiting the data available. Urbina, supra note 1, at A13. 
 4. See, e.g., Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Dark Side of a Natural Gas Boom, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at B1.  In some cases, fracking fluid has advanced through 
fissures created by the fracking process into old water wells, and subsequently into 
underground water resources, thus polluting local drinking water. Id. 
 5. Stephen G. Osborne et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water 
Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. OCTOBER 2011 EDITION 8172, 8172–73 (2011). 
 6. CTR. FOR WORKFORCE INFO. & ANALYSIS, PA. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., 
MARCELLUS SHALE FAST FACTS 15 (2011). 
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industries.7  At a time when the financial crisis has run a number of 
states’ budgets to a financial precipice,8 the natural gas industry 
provides a stable source of tax revenue.9  Moreover, a large state 
supply of natural gas would decrease dependence on other energy 
sources, namely coal and nuclear power, which operate within 
unstable regulatory environments.10 
Currently, New York faces both a host of financial issues and its 
own energy crunch.  The upcoming closing of the Indian Point 
nuclear power plant, which supplies up to 25% of New York City and 
Westchester County’s energy capacity, and the simultaneous impact 
of proposed state and environmental regulations may cause a 50% 
reduction in New York State’s generating capacity by 2016.11  As a 
result, state officials are pushing the State to look for more stable 
sources of energy.12 
Due to stricter federal regulation of dirty fossil fuels, such as coal 
and oil,13 and advancements in drilling technology, natural gas, which 
 
 7. From 2008 Q1 to 2011 Q1, the Pennsylvania employment rate has increased 
by 114% in core natural gas industries, adding 10,900 jobs, and has decreased by less 
than 1% in ancillary industries, losing 1,000 jobs. Id. at 4.  Over the same period, 
Pennsylvania’s unemployment rate has increased by 3%, losing 160,000 jobs. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, The Little State With a Big Mess, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2011, at B1. 
 9. TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE 
PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS SHALE NATURAL GAS PLAY: AN UPDATE 12 (2010), 
available at http://www.energyindepth.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/PSU-
Marcellus-Updated-Economic-Impact.pdf.  Researchers at PSU estimated that the 
natural gas industry generated more than 29,000 jobs and $240 million in 
Pennsylvania state and local taxes in 2008. Id. at 19.  Additionally, landowner 
royalties on a typical horizontal well (priced at $6 per 1,000 cubic feet of gas with a 
12.5% royalty payment) will accrue to $750,000 to $1 million over a five-year period. 
N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON STATE ASSET MAXIMIZATION, FINAL REPORT 62 (2009). 
 10. Joseph De Avila, Property: Area Power Needs Debated, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 
2011, at A22. 
 11. N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, POWER TRENDS 2011: ENERGIZING NEW YORK’S 
LEGACY OF LEADERSHIP 39–41 (2011). 
 12. Id. at 44.  The upcoming regulations require the improving of power plants to 
achieve: “reasonably available control technology for oxides of nitrogen,” “best 
available retrofit technology,” “maximum achievable control technology,” and “best 
technology available for cooling water intake structures.” Id. at 40.  On the other 
hand, some researchers have also found the energy threat to New York may be 
overstated based on assumptions that New York must maintain its current capacity 
surplus. See TIM WOOLF ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, INC., INDIAN POINT 
ENERGY CENTER NUCLEAR RETIREMENT ANALYSIS 32 (2011). 
 13. See, e.g., Editorial, The EPA’s War on Jobs, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2011, at 
A14; Shawn McCarthy, Pricey U.S. Carbon Rules Pose Hurdles for Oil Sands, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 7, 2010, at B1. 
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is the cleanest burning fossil fuel, has become a much more attractive 
resource.14  The skyrocketing demand for locally extracted and 
developed natural gas that can be supplied with minimal 
transportation costs is clearly an incentive behind New York’s 
Department of Environmental Conservation’s (DEC’s) push to 
permit instate well drilling and development. 
On a national scale, consumption is rapidly increasing.15  The 
current oversupply of natural gas on the market has pushed natural 
gas prices down.16  In anticipation of the expected shift by U.S. 
utilities from coal to natural gas,17 however, producers are still 
desperately seeking to open up more untapped domestic natural gas 
resources.18  An increasing percentage of domestic natural gas 
resources are coming from shale gas.19 
New York sits atop one of the largest shale formations in the 
country, the Marcellus Shale.  Shale gas found in a shale formation is 
thermogenic gas.20  Thermogenic gas, the type of natural gas found in 
the Marcellus Shale, is formed over millions of years by the 
application of heat and pressure to buried organic matter.21  Wells 
drilled into the gas reservoir allow the highly compressed gas to 
 
 14. OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 3–4 
(2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/ 
epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf. 
 15. Natural gas consumption in the United States rose from 21.7 trillion cubic feet 
in 2006 to 24.1 trillion cubic feet in 2010. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, Natural Gas Consumption in the United States, 2006-2011, NAT. GAS 
MONTHLY, Apr. 2011, at 5 tbl.2, available at http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/ 
monthly/archive/2011/2011_04/pdf/ngm_all.pdf. 
 16. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHORT TERM ENERGY 
OUTLOOK, Sept. 2012, at 6, available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ 
steo/archives/sep12.pdf. 
 17. Rebecca Smith, Coal-Fired Plants Mothballed by Gas Glut, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
12, 2012, at B1. 
 18. See, e.g., Natural Gas Weekly Update for Week Ending September 12, 2012, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/ 
weekly/archive/2012/09_13/index.cfm. 
 19. MASS. INST. OF TECH. ENERGY INITIATIVE, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 27–29 (2012), available at 
http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Report.pdf [hereinafter MIT ENERGY 
INITIATIVE] (noting that from 2000 to 2009, the contribution of shale gas to US 
annual gross gas production increased from 1% to 14%). 
 20. Id. at 17. 
 21. Id.  Similar to conventional natural gas, thermogenic natural gas is primarily 
methane, and may contain small amounts of ethane, propane, butane, carbon 
dioxide, nitrogen, or hydrogen sulphide. Id. 
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expand through the wells.22  Due to the very low permeability of these 
wells, it is generally not cost-effective to drill a vertical well into the 
formations.23  Using an advanced technology like fracking makes the 
development of unconventional resources cost-effective.24 
Recently, the U.S. Geological Survey increased its assessment of 
the Marcellus Shale from 2 trillion cubic feet to approximately 84 
trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, technically recoverable natural 
gas.25  The wellhead value of 50 trillion cubic feet of natural gas may 
be $1 trillion; thus, making the natural gas in the Marcellus Shale 
worth close to $1 trillion.26 
Responding to public concerns, many towns and cities across the 
country have taken the initiative to prohibit local gas drilling.  In New 
York, several towns27 have amended or passed zoning ordinances that 
would ban fracking, “high impact heavy industry,”28 or gas drilling 
entirely.  Gas drilling companies advocated strongly against these 
zoning ordinances, and are now filing suit to invalidate them.29  The 
DEC has not taken a position against municipalities in court.30  The 
Court of Appeals has yet to rule on a municipality’s authority to ban 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 18. 
 24. Id. at 36–37. 
 25. USGS Releases New Assessment of Gas Resources in the Marcellus Shale, 
Appalachian Basin, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, (Aug. 23, 2011, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2893. 
 26. See INDEP. OIL & GAS ASS’N OF N.Y., HOMEGROWN ENERGY: THE FACTS 
ABOUT NATURAL GAS EXPLORATION OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE 3 (2009). 
 27. Many towns and cities in New York State are considering adopting zoning 
ordinances that effectively ban fracking within any part of the town or city, and 
several have already done so. Municipal Anti-Fracking Movements in New York 
State, CMTY. ENVTL. LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://celdf.org/img/original/ 
NY%20map%20key%20for%20non%20rights%20based%20efforts%20101511.gif 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013).  Buffalo, Wales, Camillus, Geneva, Cherry Valley, 
Middlefield, Oneonta, Otsego, Plainfield, Springfield, Danby, Dryden, Ithaca, and 
Syracuse have all already passed zoning ordinances effectively banning fracking. Id. 
 28. Glynis Hart, Dryden Accepts Measure to Ban Fracking, ITHACA TIMES, June 
22, 2011, http://www.ithaca.com/news/east/article_0d24a71c-9cf5-11e0-b712-001cc4c 
002e0.html. 
 29. See Andrew Barber, Fracking Shame, N.Y. POST, Feb. 27, 2011, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/fracking_shame_9uD035Hsq3dz4tLgiFdPWP. 
 30. See generally N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation et al., Revised Draft 
Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the Oil, Gas and 
Solution Mining Regulatory Program (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf [hereinafter REVISED DRAFT 
SGEIS]. 
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fracking locally.  Two lower courts have only recently taken up 
litigation directly addressing the issue.31 
This Note argues that New York State law does not preclude local 
zoning ordinances from prohibiting local fracking.  Part I of this Note 
lays out the origin of local zoning authority in the state constitution 
and subsequent statutes.  Part I also outlines the preemption analysis 
that a court dealing with a challenge to a local anti-fracking ordinance 
will likely apply.  Part II examines the conflict among case precedent 
that would uphold local zoning ordinances based on express statutory 
language or based on constitutional authority, and case precedent 
that would find express preemption.  Part III concludes that a 
constitution-based approach to local authority that adheres to the 
plain meaning of the constitution most adequately protects local 
interests of those affected, and best preserves predictability in judicial 
statutory construction. 
I.  FRACKING AND ITS CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. What Is Fracking, and Who Regulates the Process? 
Fracking is a process of stimulating a natural gas well to maximize 
the amount of recoverable natural gas from the well.32  To frack shale 
rock, drillers first drill a vertical well that reaches beyond the 
underground water resources33 to the shale formation.34  A pipe 
extends through the well,35 and is encased in cement pursuant to 
agency regulations.36  Once the pipe reaches the shale formation, a 
lateral wellbore will drill 2,000 to 6,000 feet into the shale formation.37  
To facilitate the escape of the highly compressed natural gas into the 
wellhead, the well operator emits fracking fluid through the piping 
 
 31. See Complaint at 1–7, Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 
943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 2011-0930); Complaint at 1–12, Anschutz 
Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 
2011-0902). 
 32. Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowha
t.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 33. The Marcellus Shale extends from an area 4,000 feet below ground-level to 
8,500 feet below ground level; treatable underground water resources are at 
approximately 850 feet below ground-level. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 19, 
at 40. 
 34. See id. at 38. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 40. 
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and into the formation causing the fracturing of shale rock.38  
Fracking fluid is principally water, but also contains sand to crack the 
shale rock, and a number of unknown chemicals.39  The potential for 
these unknown chemicals to reach water wells through fissures 
formed during the fracking process,40 and the issue of what to do with 
the millions of gallons of water mixed with possibly toxic chemicals 
that will return through the wellhead, are significant environmental 
concerns.41 
Fracking exists within a complex web of overlapping regulatory 
bodies.42  Due to its heavy use and discharge of water, it falls under 
the jurisdiction of federal, state, and interstate governing bodies.43  
Due to the high volume of gas extracted in the process, it falls under 
state regulation, and due to the fact that drilling involves 
development of local property, it may fall under local government 
authority as well.44 
B. Federal Law & Interstate Law 
The federal government, through the EPA, sets standards for what 
can be injected underground, and how to dispose of the wastewater 
 
 38. See id. at 40. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Mouawad & Krauss, supra note 4. 
 41. See Documents: Natural Gas’s Toxic Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/07/us/natural-gas-documents-
1.html#document/p1 (noting studies are inconclusive as to the capability of water 
treatment plants and waterways to remove pollutants of concern such as 
radionuclides).  The Niagara Falls government claims its water treatment plant can 
adequately treat the fracking wastewater. Carolyn Thompson, Niagara Falls 
Envisions Profit in ‘Fracking’ Waste, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/APe76d13d8158a4d25978ec3a8e246ef2a.html.  Once 
through the plant, the wastewater would be released into the Niagara River or reused 
in fracking. Id.  The EPA has announced plans to issue standards regulating the 
cleanliness of the water discharged. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1962b (2006) (establishing the 
Delaware River Basin Commission to regulate the water withdrawals needed for gas 
drilling from the basin); 43 C.F.R. § 3162 (2012) (regulating drilling operations on 
federal and Indian lands). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 806.5 (2012); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 
§ 23-0303 (McKinney 2012); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-3301 (McKinney 2012) 
(requiring persons conducting any operations with the capacity to withdraw more 
than 100,000 gallons of groundwater or surface water per day to file with the 
Department of Environmental Conservation). 
 44. N.Y. CONST. art. IX § 2(b); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 
2012); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303 (McKinney 2012). 
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that returns to the surface.45  Under the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA), states are authorized to administer underground injection 
programs requiring prospective drillers to seek permits disclosing the 
chemicals they plan to inject underground.46  A 2005 amendment to 
the SDWA prohibits the EPA administrator from prescribing 
requirements that interfere with any underground injection for the 
recovery of natural gas unless essential to ensuring the safety of 
underground sources of drinking water.47  The term “underground 
injection” excludes the “injection of fluids or propping agents (other 
than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related 
to . . . gas . . . production activities.”48  Therefore, unless gas drillers 
that plan to use fracking technology inject diesel fuel underground, 
they are not required to seek a permit, or to disclose any of the 
chemicals in their fracking fluid under federal law.49  Even a 
restriction on diesel fuel has proven overly burdensome for gas 
drillers who have yet to file for a diesel fuel permit under SDWA, 
though multiple tests of fracking wastewater have found diesel fuel is 
being used in fracking fluid.50 
Acting in tandem with SDWA, the Clean Water Act endows the 
EPA with authority to set standards for the discharge of effluent that 
comes back up through the well.51  Under the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), the EPA prohibits the 
direct discharge of fracking wastewater into waters of the United 
 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(1) (2006). 
 46. Id. § 300h. 
 47. Id. § 300h(b)(2)(B). 
 48. Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii).  This exemption was passed following a 2004 EPA 
report concluding that “the injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids into [coal bed 
methane] wells poses little or no threat to [underground sources of drinking water].” 
OFFICE OF GROUND WATER & DRINKING WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, at ES-9 (2004).  
Diesel fuel in fracking fluid was found to present “the greatest threat” to 
underground sources of drinking water. Id. at 4–11. 
 49. A driller using diesel fuel in fracking fluid must seek EPA authorization. 40 
C.F.R. §§ 144–48 (2012).  However, a Congressional investigation found oil and gas 
service companies had injected over thirty-two million gallons of diesel fuel or 
fracking fluid containing diesel fuel into wells in nineteen states from 2005 to 2009 
without permits. See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman et al. to Lisa Jackson, 
Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 31, 2011), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/waxman-markey-
and-degette-investigation-finds-continued-use-of-diesel-in-hydraulic-fracturing-
f#_ftn6. 
 50. See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman et al., supra note 49. 
 51. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
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States52 and sets minimum standards for the quality of pre-treatment 
wastewater.53  The DEC administers NPDES on a statewide level.54  
Fracking wastewater still ends up in New York’s rivers and lakes.55  
The majority of water treatment centers, though happy to take the 
wastewater and the payments that come along with it, are not 
properly equipped to fully treat wastewater that has been 
contaminated with a host of unknown chemicals.56 
Fracking requires tons of water and naturally results in tons of 
wastewater rising back to the surface.57  A large portion of that water 
will likely come from the Delaware River Basin, which extends into 
southeastern New York, and the Susquehanna River Basin, which 
extends into south central New York.  The Delaware River Basin 
Commission (DRBC) and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission 
(SRBC) regulate the rate and volume of water withdrawals from their 
respective basins.58  Their regulatory authority overlaps with federal, 
 
 52. 40 C.F.R. §§ 435.12–30 (requiring the use of the best available technology to 
limit effluent discharge). 
 53. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Notice of Final 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program, 76 
Fed. Reg. 66,286 (Oct. 26, 2011).  Although the EPA presently allows state agencies 
to set pretreatment fracking wastewater standards, the EPA has published a notice of 
intent to set national standards in this area. Id.  Under present regulations, prior to 
accepting wastewater, the publicly owned treatment works (POTW) must notify the 
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and both the POTW and the 
DEC will determine the capability of the POTW to handle such wastewater. 40 
C.F.R. 122.42(b) (2012).  National EPA standards could provide a more 
comprehensive review of the capability of POTWs to treat fracking wastewater in 
particular. 
 54. Letter from Russell E. Train, Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to 
Hugh Carey, Governor of N.Y. (Oct. 28, 1975), available at 
http://www.northwestenvironmentaladvocates.org/nweafiles/NPDES_Letters/NY%2
0NPDES%20Approval%20Letter.pdf (authorizing Governor Carey to administer 
the NPDES permit program). 
 55. David B. Caruso, Pa. Allows Dumping of Tainted Waters from Gas Boom, 
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/3/pa-
allows-dumping-of-tainted-waters-from-gas-boom/?page=all. But see Jerry Zremski, 
Fracking Boom Could Go Bust, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 13, 2011, at C1. 
 56. See, e.g., Mark Scheer, Flood of Comments Expected at Water Board 
Meeting, NIAGARA GAZETTE, Nov. 23, 2011, http://niagara-
gazette.com/local/x1295782769/Flood-of-comments-expected-at-Water-Board-
meeting; Charlie Specht, ‘Fracking’ Residue Poses Concerns in Falls, BUFFALO 
NEWS, Sept. 23, 2011, at D1. 
 57. OFFICE OF RESEACH & DEV., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING RESEARCH STUDY 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov 
/safewater/uic/pdfs/hfresearchstudyfs.pdf. 
 58. See Environmental Review Process for Natural Gas Exploration in the 
Marcellus Shale, N.Y. STATE DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html?showprintstyles (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
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state, and local authority.59  Having rejected a vote on new regulations 
governing gas development, the DRBC has imposed a de facto 
moratorium on new drilling in the basin for an indefinite period of 
time.60  The SRBC prohibits water withdrawal to the extent it 
interferes with the regular withdrawal of another user of the River 
and requires review and approval of all gas development projects61 
that may affect interstate water quality or significantly impact the 
comprehensive plan.62 
C. New York State Law 
1. Fracking on Hold 
Although the DEC disputes the authority of these interstate bodies 
to impose a moratorium on drilling in New York, the issue is moot 
while a de facto moratorium imposed by the DEC continues.  The 
DEC’s Commissioner, Joe Martens, announced he may delay new 
high-volume fracking permits until 2013 while the DEC reviews the 
overwhelming number of public comments filed in response to the 
Revised Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact 
Statement (SGEIS).63  Prior to the current de facto moratorium, 
 
 59. See generally DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, DELAWARE RIVER BASIN 
COMPACT (1961), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/regs/compa.pdf; 
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMM’N, ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION AND WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION OF 
STATE OF NEW YORK (1965), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/ 
library/coduments/AA/NY-highres.pdf; SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 
SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMPACT (1972), available at http://www.srbc.net/ 
about/srbc_compact.pdf. 
 60. James Gerken, Delaware River Basin Fracking Decision Delayed, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 2011, 3:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/11/23/delaware-river-basin-fracking-decision_n_1108141.html; Natural Gas 
Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/ 
programs/natural/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (noting no new updates on the status of 
regulations). 
 61. 18 C.F.R. § 806.4(a)(8) (2012). 
 62. Id. § 806.5(a).  The standards for water withdrawals are found at 18 C.F.R. § 
806.23. 
 63. DEC Commissioner Joe Martens, citing the significant number of comments 
received by the agency during the notice and comment period on proposed permit 
rules for gas drilling and the inability of other state agencies to finalize their hydraulic 
fracturing reports on time, says “he can’t predict” whether hydraulic fracturing 
permits will be issued in 2012. Karen DeWitt, Fracking Report Will Be Delayed, Says 
New York’s Environmental Commissioner, WSKGNEWS (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://wskgnewsarchive.org/2011/10/25/fracking-report-will-be-delayed-says-new-
yorks-environmental-commissioner/. 
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Former Governor Patterson mandated an official moratorium on all 
new high-volume drilling permits while the DEC drafted a SGEIS.64  
Governor Patterson’s moratorium ended in June 2011, yet no new 
permits have been issued.65  Under the DEC’s Revised Draft SGEIS, 
New York would have among the strictest rules governing fracking in 
the nation.66 
New York and other states distinguish between high-volume and 
low-volume fracking.67  New York’s upcoming regulations will cover 
only high-volume fracking operations,68 and this Note only addresses 
the dispute over regulation of high-volume fracking.  High-volume 
fracking typically requires multiple stages of drilling and more than 
300,000 gallons of fracking fluids.69  According to 2009 Division of 
Mineral Resources statistics, there are 6,628 active natural gas wells, 
including low-volume fracked wells, in New York State.70 
2. Environmental Conservation Law 
The Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) established the DEC 
to carry out New York’s environmental policy by improving natural 
resource protection and coordinating among the federal, regional, 
and local governments, and private organizations.71  DEC is charged 
with adopting regulations and policies that encourage industrial, 
commercial, residential, and community development; maximize 
environmental benefits; and minimize the effects of less desirable 
environmental conditions.72  New York’s legislature added to this 
general mandate to regulate land use with the passage of the Oil, Gas 
and Solution Mining Law. 
 
 64. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 58. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Compare REVISED DRAFT SGEIS, supra note 30, at 3-14 to 3-15 (barring 
fracking within 2,000 feet of drinking water supplies, 500 feet of private wells, and 
4,000 feet of the New York City and Syracuse watersheds), with 25 Pa. Code § 
78.60(b)(7) (2013) (barring fracking within 100 feet of streams and wetlands and 200 
feet of structures unless the applicant receives a waiver). 
 67. See, e.g., STATE OF MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, HIGH VOLUME 
HYDRAULIC WELL COMPLETIONS (2011), available at http://www.michigan.gov/ 
documents/deq/SI_1-2011_353936_7.pdf. 
 68. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7.41 (2013). 
 69. REVISED DRAFT SGEIS, supra note 30, at 3–6. 
 70. New York Natural Gas & Oil Production, N.Y. ST. DEP’T ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1601.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) 
(follow “2009 zip file” hyperlink). 
 71. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 1-0101 (McKinney 2012). 
 72. Id. § 03-0301(1)(g). 
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3. Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law 
In 1971, the New York Legislature passed the Oil, Gas and 
Solution Mining Law (OGS), amending the ECL, which entrusted the 
DEC with the authority to regulate the state’s oil, gas, and mining 
industry.73  The explicit policy goals of the OGS are to foster the 
development of New York’s natural resources, prevent waste, and 
protect the rights of private landowners and the public.74  The OGS 
grants the DEC and its Commissioner powers to require—and set 
standards for—the drilling, operating casing, plugging, and re-
plugging of wells,75 as well as the power to specify the required 
distance between wells and underground water sources.76  Further, the 
DEC has exclusive authority to issue a permit to drill.77 
The express regulatory scheme defines only a limited local role.  
ECL section 23-0303(2) was amended in 1981 to read, “[t]he 
provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances 
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas, and solution mining 
industries; but shall not supersede local government jurisdiction over 
local roads or the rights of local governments under the real property 
tax.”78  The prior version did not include the phrase “shall supersede 
all local laws or ordinances.”79  At its discretion, the DEC may seek 
the cooperation of local authorities to enforce regulations proposed 
and adopted by the DEC.80  Otherwise, the recipients of DEC-issued 
drilling permits must notify the local government prior to the 
commencement of drilling operations, and nothing more.81  Even in 
the case of municipal property damage, the local government is 
directed to go through the DEC to request reimbursement.82 
At first glance, the provision appears to grant complete authority 
to the DEC to override all local laws that interfere with gas 
 
 73. Id. § 23-0301. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. § 23-0305(8)(d). 
 76. Id. § 23-0503 (“The [DEC] shall issue a permit to drill, deepen, plug back or 
convert a well, if the proposed spacing unit submitted to the department pursuant to 
paragraph a of subdivision 2 of section 23-0501 of this title conforms to statewide 
spacing.”). 
 77. Id. § 23-0305. 
 78. Id. § 23-0303(2). 
 79. In re Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone. 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
 80. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0305(11). 
 81. Id. § 23-0305(13). 
 82. Id. § 23-0303(3)(a). 
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regulation.  However, in prior decisions involving statutory 
construction of similar language, the Court of Appeals has read the 
language, “shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the 
regulation,” narrowly.83  Essentially, state law would supersede a 
limited spectrum of local laws. 
Up until 2012, there was only one reported decision addressing 
ECL section 23-0303(2).  In Envirogas, Inc v. Town of Kiantone, the 
Chatauqua County Supreme Court invalidated a town zoning 
ordinance that mandated the payment of a $2,500 compliance bond 
and a $25 permit fee prior to construction of a gas or oil well.84  Under 
the Envirogas court’s construction of the statute, a local law or 
ordinance that reasonably relates to the regulation of the gas industry 
will be struck down.85  Imposing local compliance bonds and permit 
fees on gas drillers reasonably relates to the gas industry; therefore, 
the court struck down the local ordinances.86 
The two 2012 courts that interpreted section 23-0303 found 
preemption analysis key to upholding zoning ordinances banning 
fracking within a town’s jurisdiction.87  In Anschutz Exploration Corp. 
v. Town of Dryden, the court analyzed section 23-0303(2)’s second 
clause exempting “local government jurisdiction over local roads or 
the rights of local governments under the real property tax” from 
state jurisdiction.88  The plaintiff in Dryden argued that OGS carves 
out two physical areas—roads and real property taxes—within which 
a local government has not been preempted.89  Therefore, according 
to the plaintiff, state law preempts regulation of any other physical 
area or site.90  In rejecting this interpretation, the court found 
regulation of local roads relates to physical area and to gas drilling 
operations: “[r]egulation of local roads . . . would plainly relate to 
operation of gas wells by directly affecting access to well sites or other 
 
 83. See, e.g., In re Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226 
(N.Y. 1996); In re Frew Run Gravel Prods. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 
1987). 
 84. See Envirogas, Inc., 447 N.Y.S.2d at 221–22. 
 85. See id. at 223. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 
724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 
N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 88. Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 468 (quoting N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303 
(McKinney 2012)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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areas of operation and by imposing additional burdens or costs.”91  
State law does not preempt local road regulation, which includes 
matter related to local road regulation.  The physical location of 
natural gas wells to be used for fracking is a matter related to local 
road regulation.  Thus, the Town of Dryden can freely regulate the 
physical location of a gas drilling well and can also regulate gas-
drilling operations to the extent that they relate to local roads or real 
property taxes.92  Any analysis of preemption necessarily starts with a 
discussion of the origin of local regulatory authority.93 
4. Preemption 
Article IX of the New York State Constitution confers broad 
police power on local governments to regulate matters involving the 
public welfare.94  The constitution directs the Legislature to “enact, 
and . . . from time to time amend, a statute of local governments 
granting to local governments powers including but not limited to 
those of local legislation and administration in addition to . . . powers 
vested in them by [the constitution].”95  The constitution further 
stipulates that once the “statute of local governments” is enacted, the 
State will have limited ability to override its reach: 
A power granted in [the statute of local governments] may be 
repealed, diminished, impaired or suspended only by enactment of a 
statute by the legislature with the approval of the governor at its 
regular session in one calendar year and the re-enactment and 
approval of such statute in the following calendar year.96 
This procedural rule, a significant restriction on state action, is known 
as the “double enactment procedure”97 or “re-enactment,”98 and plays 
a pivotal role in the future application of this constitutional provision. 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id.; see also Cooperstown Holstein, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 730 (noting OGS’s 
legislative history “clearly demonstrates the state’s interest in regulating the 
‘activities,’ i.e., the manner and method, of the industry”). 
 93. See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907 (N.Y. 
1987); N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 918 (N.Y. 
1987), aff’d, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (N.Y. 1981). 
 94. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1); see also N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc., 505 
N.E.2d at 917; De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d at 1261. 
 95. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1). 
 96. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1); see N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 2 (McKinney 
2012) (“statute of local governments”). 
 97. See, e.g., Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 583 (N.Y. 1977).  The 
procedure is known as “double enactment” because the legislation must be adopted 
twice in successive legislative sessions. 
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Additionally, the constitution granted that in the absence of state 
action in a field, the local government may have authority to act first: 
[E]very local government shall have power to adopt and amend 
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or 
any general law relating to the following subjects, whether or not 
they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local 
government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict 
the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property, 
affairs or government of such local government.99 
A later statute, however, repealed this power to the extent it goes 
beyond local authority over matters relating to “property, affairs or 
government of local government.”100  Where “property, affairs or 
government of local government” are involved, courts find the 
Legislature has either not acted with regard to the subject matter, or 
explicitly carved out an area in which the local government may act.101  
Reading local authority in these situations broadly, courts rarely 
preclude local regulation if the subject matter of the regulation relates 
to the public welfare. 
The “statute of local governments,” enacted pursuant to 
constitutional mandate, outlines the general scope of the legislative 
and administrative powers endowed in local government.102  These 
powers include: “The power to adopt, amend and repeal ordinances, 
resolutions and rules and regulations in the exercise of [the local 
government’s] functions, powers and duties.”103  State legislation and 
case precedent more succinctly illustrate the extent of local authority. 
New York’s Town Law provides some guidance as to the zoning 
authority of local governments.104  The statute empowers the town 
board to regulate and restrict “the location and use of buildings, 
 
 98. County of Nassau v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 920 N.Y.S.2d 873, 883 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011); see also Michael E. Kenneally & Todd M. Mathes, Natural Gas 
Production & Municipal Home Rule in New York, 10 N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. REP. 
(West) at 1 (Jan./Feb. 2010). 
 99. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c). 
 100. LOCAL GOV’TS § 11(4); see also Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 920 
N.Y.S.2d at 883. 
 101. See infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 102. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10.  The “statute of local governments” also restates the re-
enactment procedure for State regulation affecting local governance of “property, 
affairs or government.” Id. § 12(1). 
 103. Id. § 10(1).  With regard to cities, towns, and villages, where such local entity 
maintains jurisdiction over the surrounding area, the entity may adopt, repeal, and 
amend zoning ordinances regarding the surrounding area. Id.§ 10(6). 
 104. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 2012). 
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structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes; 
provided that such regulations shall apply to and affect only such part 
of a town as is outside the limits of any incorporated village or city.”105  
This authority over land use has been construed as the local 
government zoning authority.  Accordingly, the town board may 
divide the area within its jurisdiction into districts of different 
permitted uses.106  Town regulations for each district are created in 
light of a town’s objective, and not the purpose of each district.107 
Once a town adopts a comprehensive plan, all town land use 
regulations must be consistent with that plan.108  Unless the plan is 
found to be ad hoc or subservient to special interests, it will be 
presumed valid.109  The plan may contain “material that identif[ies] 
the goals, objectives, principles, guidelines, policies, standards, 
devices and instruments for the immediate and long-range protection, 
enhancement, growth and development of the town located outside 
the limits of any incorporated village or city.”110 
The power to create zones of different permissible land uses has 
been gradually developed by precedent.  Case law defines the 
implementation of a zoning ordinance as “essentially a legislative 
act.”111  The purpose of zoning is “to regulate land use generally.”112  
Implicit in the authority to regulate land use is the right to limit the 
uses to which property may be put.113  A zoning ordinance prohibiting 
a certain activity does not make the activity itself illegal; it makes it 
illegal for the individual to use the land in the manner proscribed by 
 
 105. Id. § 261. 
 106. Id. § 262. 
 107. Id. § 263; see also Connell v. Town of Granby, 209 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1961). 
 108. TOWN § 272-a(11); see also Infinity Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Town of 
Huntington, 854 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).  Since Ramapo, the Court 
of Appeals has conducted stricter review of town plans where the court finds local 
control has had “crippling efforts toward regional and State-wide problem solving.” 
John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State-
Interests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 498 (1993) (citing In re 
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972)). 
 109. TOWN § 263; see also Randolph v. Brookhaven, 337 N.E.2d 763, 765 (N.Y. 
1975); Udell v. Hass, 235 N.E.2d 897, 897 (N.Y. 1968) (“[Defendant must make an 
adequate] showing that the change does not conflict with the community’s basic 
scheme for land use.”). 
 110. TOWN § 272-a(11). 
 111. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243 (N.Y. 1975). 
 112. Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 
1987). 
 113. Young v. City of Binghamton, 447 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1024 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). 
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the ordinance.114  This distinction illustrates the difference between 
state power to outlaw an activity, and local power to limit land uses.  
Therefore, a zoning ordinance prohibiting gas drilling would not 
make gas drilling illegal per se, but it would make gas drilling illegal 
within a certain area. 
State and local authority to regulate land use generally overlap in 
many areas, and their overlapping does not necessarily mean one is 
prohibited, or preempted, from regulating in that area.115  If state and 
local legislation are “inconsistent,” then one will be invalidated.116  If 
the latter is to be invalidated, then state law has preempted local 
regulation.  Inconsistent regulation likely inhibits the effectiveness of 
state regulation, and thwarts state policy concerns.117  Inconsistency, 
and thus preemption, occurs in one of two ways: (1) the local law 
directly conflicts with the state law;118 or (2) the State Legislature has 
evidenced its intent to regulate exclusively the subject matter, or 
field.119 
A direct conflict arises where local government is prohibited from 
taking a certain action; specifically, if the local law permits action 
specifically prohibited by state law or local law removes rights 
specifically granted to persons by state law.120  Naturally, direct 
 
 114. See Town of Fenton v. Tedino, 356 N.Y.S.2d 397, 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). 
 115. See, e.g., Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 417 
N.E.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. 1980) (explaining that the court never construed the principle of 
pre-emption so broadly that the mere fact that the State deals with a subject it 
automatically pre-empts it); Sonmax, Inc. v. City of New York, 372 N.E.2d 9, 12 
(N.Y. 1977) (“[L]ack of uniformity is [not] the same as inconsistency or 
contradiction.”); People v. Lewis, 64 N.E.2d 702, 704 (N.Y. 1945) (“Laws dealing with 
the same subject matter are not necessarily incompatible because not identical.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 930 (N.Y. 
1991); Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1987); 
Ames v. Smoot, 471 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130–31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
 117. See Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 905–06. 
 118. Only recently has direct conflict been considered a form of preemption. See, 
e.g., Dougal v. County of Suffolk, 477 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); 
Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Koch, 462 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1983), aff’d, 463 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1984). 
 119. See, e.g., DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 190 (N.Y. 
2001); Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 905; Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc. v. 
Town of Hempstead, 933 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
 120. See Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 905.  Prior to Jancyn, courts found inconsistency 
where the local law permitted action barred under state law and where the local law 
barred action under State law. See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y. 
1974); Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 
864 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), aff’d, 189 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 1963).  If the prior rule had 
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conflicts are less common when local legislation prohibits actions that 
are permissible under state law.121 
The state law governing solid waste management and resource 
recovery facilities is an example of concurrent state and local 
regulation.122  The Solid Waste Management and Resource Recovery 
Facilities Law reads, “[a]ny local laws, ordinances or regulations of 
any governing body of a county, city, town or village which are not 
inconsistent with this title or with any rule or regulation which shall 
be promulgated pursuant to this title shall not be superseded by it.”123  
By its plain language, the statute welcomes local variations of the 
state law, as long as the local variation is consistent with state 
regulation.124  In Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v. Town of 
Caledonia, the court upheld an ordinance that set a stricter standard 
than that stated in the state statute.125  The local ordinance imposed a 
condition on the collection of refuse under the state statute: refuse 
generated outside of the Town of Caledonia will only be accepted at 
facilities licensed by the Caledonia if the Town Board authorizes it 
and such receipt is consistent with the regional comprehensive solid 
waste management plan.126 
In People v. New York Trap Rock Corp., a case dealing with 
criminal nuisance, the court did not find explicit statutory language 
outlining the local regulatory role.127  Instead, the court looked 
beyond the state statute at issue to find legislative intent that the 
municipality could regulate.128  Per State Penal Law, a person is guilty 
of criminal nuisance if, “he knowingly or recklessly creates or 
maintains a condition which endangers the safety or health of a 
 
been applied literally there could never be a local variation of state law that would 
withstand judicial review. 
 121. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 
1235 (N.Y. 1996) (upholding a local zoning ordinance that further narrowed the area 
within which mining is a permissible land use). 
 122. See Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 417 
N.E.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. 1980). 
 123. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0711 (McKinney 2012). 
 124. Monroe-Livingston, 417 N.E.2d at 80. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. at 80.  If a person has received a state-issued permit to conduct an 
activity that the local government concurrently regulates, the person must still abide 
by local law. See id. 
 127. 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 1982) (“There is nothing in section 240.45 of the 
Penal Law, the criminal nuisance statute, to indicate an intention by the Legislature, 
directly or indirectly, to restrict the town’s power to enact a noise ordinance.”). 
 128. See id. at 1225. 
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considerable number of persons.”129  For issues of state-local power, 
the Municipal Home Rule Law demands a broad reading of local 
authority to regulate the field of public welfare.130  The challenged 
zoning ordinance expanded the application of criminal nuisance to 
include “unnecessary noise” that “annoys, disturbs, injures or 
endangers the comfort, repose, health, peace or safety of a person.”131  
The court found local regulation of criminal nuisance permissible 
absent statutory language to the contrary.132  Here, the state law was 
silent regarding local authority, and the court found the local 
government may regulate where the subject matter is reasonably 
related to local public welfare.133 
In Walker v. Town of Hempstead, the town ordinance at issue 
required prior notification to the town government before any defect 
in a public space could be used as reason to file an action against the 
local government.134  However, the state statute read, “[n]o other or 
further notice . . . shall be required as a condition to the 
commencement of an action” against the local government.135  
Impliedly, there are permissible local variations in the field of civil 
litigation against the local government, but additional conditions on 
filing procedures is not one of them.  The end result is quite similar to 
the cases above wherein local variations of state regulation are 
“inconsistent” with state regulation and thereby ultra vires if local 
regulations are weaker. 
A state statute that expressly prohibits136 or preempts137 local law 
precludes exercise of the supersession authority by indicating a desire 
 
 129. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2012). 
 130. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1) (McKinney 2012). 
 131. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d at 1224 (citing Town of Poughkeepsie 
Unnecessary Noise Control Ordinance § 3.01). 
 132. Id. (“[L]ocal governments have been given broad authority to adopt 
ordinances governing the safety, health and well-being of those within their 
jurisdictions.”). If, on the other hand, statutory silence were interpreted to prohibit 
local regulation of the subject matter, it “would vitiate the concept of home rule.” 
Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Koch, 462 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1983), aff’d, 463 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1984). 
 133. See N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 1982). 
 134. 643 N.E.2d 77, 79 (N.Y. 1994). 
 135. Id. 
 136. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 2012); see Walker, 
643 N.E.2d at 79. 
 137. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 349 (N.Y. 1989); Albany Area 
Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 1989). 
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to prohibit “the possibility of varying local legislation.”138  The 
overriding authority of the State to preempt local legislation 
embodies “the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to act, as it 
always had, with respect to matters of state concern.”139  Due to the 
broad scope of the State’s police power,140 the absence of statutory 
purpose to preclude local variation of state legislation implies that the 
State intended that the local government have authority to regulate.141  
However, the absence of preemption alone is not enough for a local 
government to take action;142 as stated above, the local government 
must derive its authority expressly from a state statute or the 
constitution.143 
Intent to preempt may be signaled by several indicators.  The four 
most prominent indicators are: (1) express language providing for 
exclusivity; (2) the nature of the subject matter being regulated; (3) 
the scope of the state legislative scheme; and (4) the need for 
statewide uniformity.144  The presence of any one of these indicators is 
sufficient to find legislative intent to preempt the subject matter.145 
 
 138. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v. Town of Caledonia, 417 N.E.2d 78, 80 
(N.Y. 1980); see also Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Koch, 462 N.Y.S.2d 
762, 764, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), aff’d, 463 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1984) (“[O]nly when the 
state has evidenced a desire to occupy the entire field to the exclusion of local law [is] 
a municipality powerless to act.”). 
 139. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1977). 
 140. Cf. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 708–09 (N.Y. 1929) (finding substantial 
“state concern” in New York City housing). 
 141. See, e.g., People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 (N.Y. 1981); People v. 
Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 455–56 (N.Y. 1974). 
 142. See Ames v. Smoot, 471 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (“A municipal 
corporation is a political subdivision of the State and its lawmaking authority can be 
exercised only to the extent that it has been delegated by the State.”). 
 143. Generally, courts have cited the Municipal Home Rule Law for the source of 
local authority to adopt laws relating to local “property, affairs or government.” See, 
e.g., Walker v. Town of Hempstead, 643 N.E.2d 77, 78 (N.Y. 1994); Kamhi v. Town of 
Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348–49 (N.Y. 1989).  Therefore, the legal issue of whether 
the state law has infringed on constitutionally protected local governance rights is 
rarely raised. 
 144. Ames, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 130–31; see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 
749 N.E.2d 186, 192 (N.Y. 2001) (finding no preemption because the declaration of 
policy does not evidence legislative intent to remove local legislation of the matter 
and the regulatory scheme is not detailed and comprehensive); Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. 
Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 930–31 (N.Y. 1991) (same). 
 145. See, e.g., Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 
920, 922 (N.Y. 1989) (“comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme” in the field of 
highway funding); Ames, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 130–31 (finding express language providing 
for exclusivity and a detailed and comprehensive regulatory scheme). 
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In Albany Area Builders Association v. Town of Guilderland, the 
Town of Guilderland imposed a transportation “impact fee” on all 
“applicants for building permits who seek to make a change in land 
use that will make additional traffic.”146  The fee fund was intended to 
pay for the expansion of the local roadway system and local 
transportation facilities.147  However, the State had already adopted 
an “elaborate budget system” delineating “how towns are to budget 
for improvements and repairs to highways,” putting a cap on town 
highway taxes, and dictating the procedures towns must adhere to in 
developing their roadway budget.148  Based on its finding of a 
comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme, the court held that 
the State evinced its purpose to preempt the entire field of roadway 
funding, thereby precluding local legislation on the subject.149 
On the other hand, local legislation is not preempted where it will 
only have an incidental effect on a comprehensive and detailed 
regulatory scheme.150  DJL Restaurant Corporation v. City of New 
York is illustrative of this concept.  In DJL, New York City amended 
its zoning ordinance to limit “adult establishments” to manufacturing 
and high-density commercial zoning districts.151  Not only did the 
ordinance limit the siting of establishments providing only adult 
entertainment, but also those businesses serving as both “adult 
establishments” and bars.152  The State preempts the field of alcohol 
distribution under the Alcohol Beverage Control Law (ABC),153 and 
the Law contains several provisions regarding nudity in bars and the 
 
 146. Albany Area Builders Ass’n, 546 N.E.2d at 921. 
 147. Id. at 921. 
 148. Id. at 922–23 (citing N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 102, 104, 107 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. 
HIGHWAY LAW §§ 141, 271 (McKinney 1989)). 
 149. Id. at 923.  In Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Red Hook, 
the Court of Appeals held that a local zoning ordinance was preempted partially 
based on the state law’s establishment of a Siting Board that “is required to 
determine whether any municipal laws or regulations governing the construction or 
operation of a proposed generating facility are unreasonably restrictive, and has the 
power to waive compliance with such municipal regulations.” 456 N.E.2d 487, 490 
(N.Y. 1983). 
 150. See, e.g., DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 191 (N.Y. 
2001); Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234–35 
(N.Y. 1996) (citing Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 
922 (N.Y. 1987)). 
 151. DJL Rest., 749 N.E.2d at 188–89 (citing N.Y.C. Amended Zoning Resolutions 
§§ 32-01(b), 42-01(b)). 
 152. Id. at 189. 
 153. Id. at 190 (citing In re Landsdown Entm’t Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Consumer 
Affairs, 543 N.E.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. 1989)). 
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siting of such establishments.154  The court read ABC as narrowly 
tailored to “promot[ing] temperance in the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages,” which is distinct from the regulation of land.155  Zoning is 
meant to regulate land use, not “the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages.”156  Invariably, regulations of these two distinct fields will 
impact one another, but such “incidental control” is permissible 
within preemption157: “separate levels of regulatory oversight can 
coexist.”158 
Even a detailed regulatory scheme may be insufficient to preempt 
where local regulation is not explicitly addressed.159  For example, in 
Village of Nyack v. Daytop Village, Daytop Village received state 
approval to open a substance abuse program in a commercial district 
where residential uses were specifically prohibited.160  Based on the 
comprehensive regulatory scheme embodied in Article 19 of the 
Mental Hygiene Law, the Appellate Division determined additional 
restrictions imposed by the local government “would clearly impose 
additional restrictions on rights granted by State law and thereby 
‘tend to inhibit the operation of the State’s general law and thereby 
thwart the operation of the State’s overriding policy concerns.’”161  
Yet the Court of Appeals reversed, finding no “inherent 
inconsistency” between the regulations.162  For the local government 
to retain authority over the siting of substance abuse programs is not 
“inconsistent” with the state agency’s authority to manage the 
program.163  Notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of the statute, 
without clear intent to divest local government of its zoning authority, 
the municipality will continue to exercise supersession authority.164 
Express language providing for exclusivity, and thus preemption, is 
found where the statute is interpreted to intend to omit a certain term 
 
 154. Id. at 190 (citing N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 106(6-a) (McKinney 2012)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 191; see also Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 
N.E.2d 920, 920 (N.Y. 1987)). 
 158. DJL Rest., 749 N.E.2d at 191 (citing Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 
583 N.E.2d 928, 931 (N.Y. 1991)). 
 159. See, e.g., Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d at 929; N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of 
New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917–18 (N.Y 1987). 
 160. Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d at 929. 
 161. Id. (quoting N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d at 917). 
 162. Id. at 929. 
 163. Id. at 930–31. 
 164. See id. 
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or criterion.165  Unlike where the statute’s silence implies a carve-out 
for local regulation, the statutes that are read to expressly preclude 
local amendment tend to contain some type of list of permissible or 
impermissible activity.166  The method of statutory construction that 
reads a statute to include only the listed items and exclude all other 
items is expressio unius est exclusio alterius: where a law expressly 
describes a particular act to which it shall apply, an irrefutable 
inference must be drawn that what is omitted was intended to be 
omitted.167  This maxim only has force when the items expressed are 
members of an associated group such that legislative intent to exclude 
other members of a grouping is clear.168 
For example, under New York’s Retirement and Social Security 
Law, the salary base upon which future pensions are calculated 
expressly excludes lump sum payments, termination pay, payment in 
lieu of retirement, and the portion of compensation over one year 
that exceeds the previous year’s compensation by more than twenty 
percent.169  The listing of these four exclusions led the Court of 
Appeals to find the State Legislature did not intend to exclude any 
other items from the calculation of salary for future pension 
purposes.170 
If there is neither express preemption of local action nor an express 
carve out for local authority in a field of regulation, courts will move 
on to implicit preemption.171  For implicit preemption, courts will 
examine the declaration of policy accompanying the legislation or a 
 
 165. See, e.g., City of New York v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 489 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1985); People v. Ceasar, 727 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
 166. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 N.E.2d 
174, 179–80 (N.Y. 2002); Walker v. Town of Hempstead, 643 N.E.2d 77, 79 (N.Y. 
1994). 
 167. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2012); see also Jewish Home & 
Infirmary of Rochester, N.Y., Inc. v. Comm’r of N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 640 
N.E.2d 125, 129 (N.Y. 1994); N.Y. Tel. Co., 489 N.Y.S.2d at 476; Ceasar, 727 N.Y.S.2d 
at 259. But see Erie County v. Whalen, 394 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), 
aff’d, 377 N.E.2d 984 (N.Y. 1978) (“[A]lthough a useful tool of statutory 
construction,’ [expressio unius est exclusio alterius] must not be utilized to defeat the 
purpose of an enactment or to override the manifest legislative intent.” (citing 
Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 280 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967))). 
 168. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed. 2007). 
 169. Weingarten, 780 N.E.2d at 179 (citing N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 431 
(McKinney 2002)). 
 170. See id. at 179. 
 171. See People ex rel. Spitzer v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 894 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 
2008). 
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comprehensive detailed regulatory scheme.172  Similarly, to express 
preemption, where courts find legislative intent to regulate without 
concurrent local regulation, the court will strike down an ordinance 
that infringes on state authority.173  In Consolidated Edison Company 
of New York, Inc. v. Town of Red Hook, the Court of Appeals found 
enlightening a declaration accompanying the enactment of the state 
statute and statements made by both Governor Rockefeller and 
Governor Carey during their respective terms about the bill.174  There, 
each statement raised the issue of a conflicting series of patchwork 
regulations that caused significant bureaucratic delays in the “field of 
siting major steam electric generating plants.”175 
The declaration of policy may also be more explicit in claiming the 
State’s authority, and will likely be deemed implicit preemption: 
“[The State’s] department of health shall have the central, 
comprehensive responsibility for the development and administration 
of the state’s policy with respect to hospital and related 
services . . . .”176  In Robin, a local ordinance prohibited hospitals not 
accredited by the State Department of Health from conducting 
abortions.177  The State Penal Law, which regulated permissible 
abortions, only required a “duly licensed physician” and that the 
woman seeking the abortion “act[] under a reasonable belief that 
such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within twenty-four weeks 
from the commencement of her pregnancy.”178  The local town 
ordinance had added to hospital-related services by adopting an 
ordinance requiring abortions to occur in hospitals, and thus acted 
contrary to the implicit intent of the legislature.179  Additionally, the 
 
 172. See, e.g., People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (N.Y. 1981); Robin v. Inc. 
Vill. of Hempstead, 285 N.E.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. 1972). 
 173. See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905–06 (N.Y. 
1987); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y 1987); 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. 
1983). 
 174. See Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Robin, 285 N.E.2d at 286 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2800 (McKinney 
1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 177. See id. at 286. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. 
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ordinance was contrary to legislative intent to regulate abortion-
related services on a statewide basis.180 
Local governments derive authority to enact local laws with respect 
to local governance issues from the New York Constitution and 
Municipal Home Rule Law.181  The vast majority of state laws will 
likely impact local governance.  Where a state and local law 
concurrently regulate a person, corporation, or activity, and the court 
is asked to resolve inconsistencies between the relevant laws, the 
court will conduct preemption analysis.182  If a state law does not 
contain express language demonstrating the state regulates 
exclusively over the subject, then the reviewing court will review the 
state law for language implying the state law regulates exclusively.183  
If the state law only implicitly regulates the subject, then courts have 
some discretion to read state law in a manner that allows for some 
degree of local regulation of the subject.184 
5. New York State Constitution and Home Rule Law 
In theory, the New York Constitution provides the easy solution to 
the OGS provision.  Courts, however, have not applied the plain 
meaning of the provision.  Article IX of the constitution dictates that 
the State Legislature must follow a unique set of adoption procedures 
whenever it passes legislation affecting local government affairs.185  
Where the procedure is not followed, the local government retains 
superseding authority over the field. 
First, Article IX directs the Legislature to adopt a “statute of local 
governments” that will define local government affairs.  The statute 
grants local governments broad authority to enact local laws with 
respect to local governmental affairs, such as the levy and collection 
of taxes, public order, welfare, and safety.186  Included among these 
powers is the authority to adopt, amend, and repeal zoning 
ordinances regarding local land usage.187 
 
 180. See id. But see generally People v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222, 
1224–25 (N.Y. 1982) (finding a state statute’s silence does not preclude the adoption 
of a local ordinance expanding the application of a state law). 
 181. See supra notes 83, 137 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. Lewis, 84 N.E. 809, 811 (N.Y. 1908). 
 184. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 N.E.2d 
174, 177–80 (N.Y. 2002). 
 185. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(i). 
 186. Id. §§ 2(c)(i), 2(c)(ii)(10). 
 187. Id. § 2(b)(i). 
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Second, any State legislation that repeals, diminishes, or impairs 
the powers reserved to the local government under the “statute of 
local governments” must adhere to a double re-enactment procedure.  
Once the infringing legislation is approved by the State Legislature 
and signed by the Governor in a regular session, it must be re-enacted 
and approved by the Legislature and the Governor the following 
year.188  Seemingly, therefore, any law that would impair the power of 
a local government to adopt zoning ordinances, including ECL 
section 23-0303(2), would be subject to the re-enactment requirement 
of Article IX, section 2(b)(i) of the New York Constitution.  ECL 
section 23-0303(2) was enacted in 1971 and amended in 1982, each by 
a single enactment.189 
The Home Rule provision was first added to the constitution in 
1894.190  The principle of Home Rule was strengthened in a 1923 
amendment.191  Adler v. Deegan is one of the first cases to confront its 
scope.  The court in Adler first established the concept of “substantial 
state concern” as a reason not to follow the double re-enactment 
procedure required by the constitution for all matters relating to local 
property, affairs, or government.192  In that case, New York City sued 
to enjoin the State from enforcing the Multiple Dwelling Law as it 
conflicted with local law.193  Chief Justice Cardozo, in a concurring 
opinion that has been cited in a majority of the opinions on the 
distinction between state and municipal authority, distinguished 
between the City’s law and zoning resolutions.194  Cardozo’s test is if 
“the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of state concern, the 
Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are concerns of the 
locality.”195  Cardozo explicitly notes, however, that a municipality 
will not be preempted from taking any action within the field.196  In 
this sense, state action in a field of local concern is substantially 
different from ordinary preemption. 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 98, at 2. 
 190. See Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 706–07 (N.Y. 1929). 
 191. See id. at 713. 
 192. See id. at 713–14. 
 193. See id. at 706. 
 194. See id. at 711–12 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring). 
 195. Id. at 713–14. 
 196. Id. at 712; see also James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: 
“The Ghost of Home Rule,” 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 718 (“[L]ocal regulation 
could be adopted to add additional protections, as long as the city’s involvement is 
consistent with the powers of the State.”). 
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Preempting the municipality from acting altogether would be a 
totally different question than whether the State may act.197  In the 
instance of urban slums, both the State and the municipality have 
authority to regulate issues of public welfare, and thus are in the 
position to enact laws or ordinances.198  Or, as Cardozo put it, “[t]he 
concern of the state to protect the health and welfare of its 
inhabitants may not stand in the way of action by the city consistent 
with the ends envisaged by the state, but adding greater safeguards 
with reference to related ends that are municipal or urban.”199  Even 
where the State has acted, the municipality may step in to regulate as 
long as the municipality only adds to standards, restrictions, or 
conditions set forth in the state statute.200  These added restrictions fit 
within the municipality’s authority to enact ordinances that further 
the public welfare. 
Courts rarely find a statute triggers the constitution’s local 
authority provision.  In deciding against applying the complicated 
procedure required per the constitution, courts have regularly cited 
Cardozo for the proposition that a strong reading of the provision 
would overrule years of precedent.201  Thus, an issue only must be a 
matter of substantial state concern for the State Legislature to have 
the authority to regulate in the field.202  In Floyd v. New York State 
Urban Development Corp., the statute in question laid out the 
procedures for local challenge of a state action to build in a zoning 
district wherein such construction was prohibited.203  If the 
municipality challenged the state action, then it was still within the 
state’s discretion whether to build in the zoning district at issue.204  
The court took a further step in the direction of state authority in 
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York.205 
Prior to the Wambat decision, the Home Rule provision of the 
New York State Constitution was amended in 1963.  The 1963 Home 
 
 197. See Adler, 167 N.E. at 712 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring). 
 198. N.Y. STAT. LOC. GOVTS. § 11(4) (McKinney 2012). 
 199. Adler, 167 N.E. at 712 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring). 
 200. See id. (“There can be no legitimate concern of the state, or none at least is 
now suggested, that would throw open Murray Hill to industry and trade, if the city 
authorities were to hold fast to the belief that it should be preserved for residences 
only.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Whalen v. Wagner, 152 N.E.2d 54, 56 (N.Y. 1958). 
 202. See Bugeja v. City of New York, 266 N.Y.S.2d 80, 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965). 
 203. See 300 N.E.2d 704, 705 (N.Y. 1973). 
 204. See id. at 706. 
 205. 362 N.E.2d 581, 586–87 (N.Y. 1977). 
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Rule Amendment was “intended to expand and secure the powers 
enjoyed by local governments.”206  Concurrently, the Municipal Home 
Rule Law and the Statute of Local Governments were amended to 
mandate that they be “liberally construed.”207  The amended Home 
Rule Law, however, maintained the previously narrowly construed 
language that the Legislature could pass any law that did not affect 
“property, affairs or government” of a locality.208  The retention of 
that phrase led many scholars to predict the amendment would have 
no effect on the judicial interpretation of home rule.209 
In Wambat, the Adirondack Park Agency Act established a 
comprehensive zoning plan affecting 119 local governments, thereby 
encroaching on local zoning power.210  The court found two subsidiary 
issues key to the resolution: (1) whether the subject is a matter of 
state concern; and (2) whether the constitution’s re-enactment 
requirement applies to matters of state concern.211  In arriving at its 
conclusion, the court assumed matters of state concern necessarily 
relate to “other than the property, affairs or government of local 
government.”212  Under such a reading of Article IX, the 
Constitution’s re-enactment procedure is never triggered when the 
matter is of State concern.  Moreover, the two subsidiary issues would 
collapse into one issue, because matters of state concern are not 
matters that would trigger the constitution’s re-enactment procedure. 
The Wambat court narrowly interpreted Article IX not to impact 
areas of the law covered by existing state regulatory bodies.213  
Wambat holds, “The price of strong local government may not be the 
destruction or even the serious impairment of strong State 
interests.”214  On the other hand, later cases have found state and local 
authority often intermingle.215  Hotel Dorset Company v. Trust for 
 
 206. Id. at 585. 
 207. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1963). 
 208. N.Y. CONST. art. IX § 3. 
 209. See J.D. Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941–1965: Retrospect & Prospect, 
15 BUFF. L. REV. 335, 338–48 (1965). 
 210. See Wambat, 362 N.E.2d at 584. 
 211. Id. at 582. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Id. at 586–87. 
 215. See, e.g., Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Res. of City of N.Y., 385 
N.E.2d 1284, 1291–92 (N.Y. 1978); Farrington v. Pinckney, 133 N.E.2d 817, 824 (N.Y. 
1956).  Matters that affect local zoning ordinances are subjected to greater scrutiny 
due to the strong local interest in maintaining zoning, or siting, as an exercise of 
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Cultural Resources of City of New York held that a state statute that 
has the appropriate level of state interest will not be rendered invalid 
by its operation in a field that is also of local concern as long as the 
enactment is reasonable and related to the State’s purpose.216  
Accordingly, matters of state concern may also be matters of local 
concern, suggesting that concurrent state and local regulation is a 
possibility. 
In City of New York et. al. v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association 
of City of New York, Inc, the State did not provide evidence that its 
legislation would serve its stated ends better than the local law, and 
the court struck the state law.217  A 1974 state statute exempted New 
York City from the mandated use of the State’s arbitration board to 
resolve collective bargaining negotiations with government 
employees, because the City had already created its own arbitration 
board.218  Without following the double re-enactment procedure, the 
State Legislature eliminated the exemption from the City by passing a 
statute purporting to give the State’s arbitration board the exclusive 
authority over negotiations between the City and city police.219  
Returning to Cardozo’s concurring opinion in Adler, the Court of 
Appeals adopted a two-part test: “the subject [must] be in a 
substantial degree a matter of State concern,” and the “subjects of 
State concern [must be] directly and substantially involved.”220  
Assuming arguendo the State has a substantial interest in the 
uniformity of impasse procedures available to police department 
members and in a fairer forum for bargaining, the court found no 
reasonable relationship between those interests and the means 
adopted to achieve them.221  Further, the State provided no evidence 
that the City-provided forum was unfair relative to the State’s 
arbitration board.222  Thus, the local law that is more effective at 
achieving the State’s stated interests was upheld. 
 
exclusive local power. Town of Monroe v. Carey, 412 N.Y.S.2d 939, 942–43 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1977), aff’d, 386 N.E.2d 1335 (N.Y. 1979). 
 216. Hotel Dorset, 385 N.E.2d at 1291–92. 
 217. See City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of N.Y., 676 
N.E.2d 847, 853 (N.Y. 1996). 
 218. See id. at 848–49. 
 219. See id. at 849. 
 220. Id. at 851–52. 
 221. See id. at 853. 
 222. See id. 
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6. Mined Land Reclamation Law 
Absent significant case precedent interpreting the OGS, courts are 
likely to rely on the courts’ interpretation of an analogous provision 
in the Mined Land Reclamation Law (MLRL), which gives the DEC 
authority to adopt regulations and issue permits to develop land that 
concurrently falls under local jurisdiction.  The MLRL’s initial 
supersession clause read, 
[T]his title shall supersede all other state and local laws relating to 
the extractive mining industry; provided, however, that nothing in 
this title shall be construed to prevent any local government from 
enacting . . . local zoning ordinances or laws which impose stricter 
mined land reclamation standards or requirements than those found 
herein.223 
Prior to MLRL enactment, some municipalities regulated local 
mining activity.224  The plain meaning of the clause precludes such 
local legislation.225  Further, the Bill Jacket characterizes the MLRL 
as establishing a statewide uniform law to replace the local patchwork 
of regulations based on little to no technical expertise.226  As for local 
ordinances that clash with the statewide law, the MLRL established a 
procedure whereby the DEC will review zoning ordinances, and 
potentially include restrictions within the permit, while reserving the 
right to cast local ordinances aside.227 
Two seminal decisions, Frew Run Gravel Products v. Town of 
Carroll228 and Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of Sardinia,229 
are of particular importance.  The Court of Appeals held in both 
cases that local zoning ordinances did not relate to the extractive 
mining industry, and therefore were not preempted under New 
 
 223. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-2703(2) (McKinney 1997). 
 224. Joan Leary Matthews, Siting Mining Operations in New York–The Mined 
Land Reclamation Law Supersession Provision, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 9, 11 
(1999). 
 225. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 
1235 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 
922 (N.Y. 1987)). 
 226. Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923 (citing Memorandum in Support of Assembly 
Bill 10463-A, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION Bill Jacket, L. 1974, c. 
1043 (May 31, 1964)). 
 227. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-2711(3) (“If the [DEC] finds that the determinations 
made by the local government . . . are reasonable and necessary, the department shall 
incorporate these into the permit, if one is issued.”). 
 228. 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987). 
 229. 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1986) 
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York’s MLRL.  The MLRL contains language regarding the State’s 
scope of regulatory authority that is very similar to the language in 
the OGS. 
Frew Run is the leading case on deciphering the extent to which 
the municipality is precluded from legislating.  In the case, the 
landowner received a DEC-issued permit to mine sand and gravel on 
his land in a zoning district wherein sand and gravel operations were 
expressly prohibited by the town’s zoning ordinance.230  Though the 
DEC had decided against the determinations of the local government, 
the local government did not cease to enforce the zoning ordinance.231  
Preemption analysis of statutory language involves examining certain 
provisions for express language outlining local authority and the 
whole statute for implicit preemption.232  Where express language is 
found, judicial review will not include implicit preemption analysis.233  
Due to the above express supersession clause detailing the scope of 
the State’s regulatory authority, the court held the validity of the 
ordinance to be determined by direct conflict preemption analysis.234 
Under the MLRL, there is direct conflict between the two 
regulatory bodies if the local law “relat[es] to the extractive mining 
industry.”235  Thus, if the local law does not “relat[e] to the extractive 
mining industry,” and is otherwise within local authority to enact, it 
will be upheld.236  The zoning ordinance at issue in Frew Run 
“regulat[es] the location, construction and use of buildings, structures, 
and the use of land in the Town of Carroll, County of Chautauqua, 
State of New York and for said purposes dividing the Town into 
districts.”237  The purported reasons behind the adoption of the 
MLRL and zoning ordinances are different, and the subject matter 
they intend to regulate are different.  The court held that “relating to 
the extractive mining industry” does not include zoning ordinances, 
 
 230. Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See id. at 923. 
 233. See id. at 921–23. 
 234. See id. at 922.  In Frew Run and the literature analyzing the decision, implicit 
preemption is distinguished from “express supersession,” wherein the statute 
expressly carves out an area within the field of regulation for local regulation. Id.; 
see, e.g., Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 98, at 1; Michelle L. Kennedy, The 
Exercise of Local Control over Gas Extraction, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 375 
(2011).  Without changing the analysis, later decisions have placed “express 
supersession” within preemption analysis. 
 235. Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. 
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which regulate land use generally; such local laws only exert 
incidental control over any particular businesses and thus are not 
preempted by ECL section 23-2703.238  Moreover, in later decisions, 
the court extended exclusive local authority over land use regulation 
in this arena to conditional zoning as long as the conditions did not 
“relate to the extractive mining industry.”239 
The court found support for its ruling in the MLRL’s legislative 
history.  Judicial review, even regarding a direct state-local conflict, 
not only entails a glance over the applicable provision, but also an 
examination of the legislative history and the statute as a whole.240  
The Governor’s Bill Jacket and the separate requirements for mining 
and mined land reclamation reinforce the notion that the Legislature 
intended to retain local zoning authority in the hands of the 
municipality.241  On the other hand, the MLRL established a 
mechanism for the DEC to reject local zoning authority.242  Overall, 
the MLRL sends conflicting messages regarding the local role in the 
regulation of mining applicants, but the plain meaning of the 
supersession clause clearly favors maintaining local zoning ordinances 
that place higher restrictions on mining applicants than the MLRL.243 
Frew Run established a framework for interpreting supersession 
clauses and is key to future cases dealing with supersession authority.  
Where the language regarding the State and local spheres of 
regulation is express, “absen[t] a clear expression of legislative intent 
 
 238. See id.  In Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, the Court 
clarified that the local government may prohibit mining activity in every zoning 
district. 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996). 
 239. See, e.g., Seaboard Contracting & Material, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 541 
N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal dismissed, 547 N.E.2d 104, (N.Y. 
1989), mot. for lv. den., 553 N.E.2d 1024 (N.Y. 1990) (upholding requirement on 
“Heavy Industry” in zoning district that they may only,”operat[e] outside a 500–foot 
radius of a residential district or a school or church or a similar place of public 
assembly and must establish that the proposed mining operation would not produce a 
significant adverse effect upon the environment”); Morrell v. C.I.D. Landfill, 510 
N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), appeal den., 511 N.E.2d 87 (N.Y. 1986) 
(upholding town ordinance conditioning approval of “excavation, stockpiling, and 
sale of mineral matter” in residential and agricultural districts on whether operations 
will create a nuisance and whether the area will be “safe and useful” upon 
termination of operations). 
 240. See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922. 
 241. See id. at 922–23 (citing N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 23-2705(8); 
MEMORANDUM OF GOVERNOR WILSON FILED WITH ASSEMBLY BILL 10463-A 
Governor’s Bill Jacket, L.1974, ch. 1043 (June 15, 1974)). 
 242. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-2711(3)(b) (McKinney 2012). 
 243. See, e.g., Ne. Mines, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 494 N.Y.S.2d 
914, 916 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
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to preempt local control over land use, the statute should not be read 
as preempting local zoning authority.”244  The MLRL very clearly 
expresses legislative intent to regulate the particulars of mining, but 
any language from which may be inferred legislative intent to 
override zoning ordinances is not nearly as express.245  Thus, the State 
has not evinced a desire to preempt the entire land use field,246 and 
the adoption of local zoning ordinances is not in direct conflict with 
state legislation.247 
II.  LOCAL OR STATE RULE OVER LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
Judicial review of local law entails reviewing state law and the 
constitution for inconsistency.248  If no inconsistency is present and the 
local government properly derives its authority to act pursuant to the 
constitution or state law, the local law will be upheld.249  In the case of 
fracking in New York, OGS is the relevant state law.250  The fracking 
process requires the use of surface land and the use of the shale lying 
below the surface.251  Thus, OGS implicates and, as demonstrated in 
Part I, conflicts with local regulation of land uses. 
Courts can examine the conflict between state and local law in one 
of two ways.  First, courts can conduct preemption analysis to 
determine whether OGS places all gas-related regulation, including 
the location of gas wells, exclusively within the state’s regulatory 
authority.252  If a court ruling on this issue were to find the OGS 
places the physical location of gas wells within the exclusive scope of 
 
 244. Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234 (N.Y. 
1996). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907 (N.Y. 
1987); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y 1987); 
People v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1239 (N.Y. 1982). 
 247. See, e.g., People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 (N.Y. 1981); Robin v. Inc. 
Vill. of Hempstead, 285 N.E.2d 285, 287 (N.Y. 1972). 
 248. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348 (N.Y. 1989); 
Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. 
1989); Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 902. 
 249. See generally, e.g., Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d 903; N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d 
915. 
 250. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305 (McKinney 2012). 
 251. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 19; see, e.g., Cooperstown Holstein 
Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 252. See Cooperstown Holstein, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 724; Anschutz Exploration Corp. 
v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); In re Envirogas, Inc. 
v. Town of Kiantone. 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 
694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
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the state’s regulatory authority, then the local government that 
restricts the physical location of gas wells would be exceeding its 
authority.  As a result, the court would strike down the local 
government’s restriction.  Second, courts can invoke constitutional 
authority for local governments to enhance public welfare protections 
adopted by state law.253  If the courts were to find that local 
governments could impose greater restrictions than those imposed 
under state law when a regulation affects the public welfare, then the 
reviewing court would uphold the local restriction. 
A. Preemption of Fracking Under the Oil, Gas, and Solution 
Mining Law 
A state statute that expressly prohibits254 or preempts255 the local 
law precludes the local government’s exercise of supersession 
authority.  The overriding authority of the State to preempt local 
legislation embodies “the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to 
act, as it always had, with respect to matters of State concern.”256  
Thus, before arriving at a question as to the scope of the local 
government’s supersession authority, courts will necessarily conduct a 
preemption analysis.257  Preemption analysis entails two steps.  First, 
courts will look for direct conflict between the state and local laws, or 
express preemption.258  Absent express preemption, courts will look 
for implied preemption.259 
If courts find implicit preemption analysis does not apply because 
the express language of OGS makes this an issue of direct conflict, 
then the scope of local authority will be determined by the plain 
meaning of the supersession clause.260  Case precedent has shown the 
comprehensiveness of the statute’s regulatory scheme, and the 
 
 253. See Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713–14 (N.Y. 1929). 
 254. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 2012); see Walker 
v. Town of Hempstead, 643 N.E.2d 77, 78–79 (N.Y. 1994). 
 255. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 349 (N.Y. 1989); Albany Area 
Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 1989). 
 256. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1977). 
 257. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 
1234 (N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he preemption question was one of statutory construction, not 
a search for implied preemption, because the Legislature included within the MLRL 
an express supersession clause.”). 
 258. See, e.g., id., Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 
(N.Y. 1987); see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186 (N.Y. 
2001). 
 259. See, e.g., Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922. 
 260. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt, 664 N.E.2d at 1234; Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922. 
HOOKER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:26 PM 
2012] ZONING OUT FRACKING 903 
legislative history is important,261 but not dispositive.262  The clause in 
OGS that outlines the scope of state jurisdiction reads, “[t]he 
provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances 
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas, and solution mining 
industries.”263  In Frew Run, based on the language, “this title shall 
supersede all other state and local laws relating to the extractive 
mining industry,” the court held that the MLRL does not implicitly 
preempt local zoning power.264  Therefore, if courts apply preemption 
analysis, they will apply direct conflict analysis. 
In Envirogas, the court found express preemption of all local laws 
relating to the subject matter of oil, gas, and mining solution 
activity.265  The court “acknowledge[d] that the qualifying language—
’relating to the regulation’—may be relevant to determining the scope 
of the supersession.”266  Further, the court emphasized that any 
interpretation of the scope of state authority must be limited by the 
constitutional requirement that local powers be liberally construed.267  
Under New York’s preemption analysis, the express preemption 
language in ECL section 23-0303(2) should not be expanded based on 
a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme, because the 
analysis does not reach implied preemption analysis unless there is no 
express preemption.268  Where there is express preemption language, 
the scope of preemption is to be determined by the language alone.269  
Therefore, “ECL § 23-0303(2) may be viewed as superseding only 
those local laws ‘relating to the regulation’ of the oil and gas 
industry.”270 
The plain meaning of the OGS supersession clause is slightly 
different from the MLRL, and this difference could be interpreted in 
two ways.  First, the Frew Run and Gernatt Asphalt decisions held 
“relating to mining activity” not to include general land use 
regulation, so long as the regulation set a higher standard than that 
 
 261. See, e.g., Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922. 
 262. See supra notes 107–23. 
 263. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2012). 
 264. Id. § 23-0703(2); see also Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921. 
 265. See Matter of Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone. 447 N.Y.S.2d 221 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
 266. Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 98, at 3. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 4. 
 269. Id. at 3–4. 
 270. Id. at 4. 
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required by state law.271  Both cases held legislative intent as 
evidenced by the MLRL did not include prohibiting general land use 
regulations, since zoning has only an “incidental effect” on mining 
regulation.272  Under direct conflict analysis, courts may interpret 
OGS to carve out room for local zoning ordinances that satisfy 
minimum DEC safety standards. 
As opposed to MLRL, OGS expressly preserves local authority 
over local roads and property taxes.  A law that expressly describes a 
particular act to which it shall not apply creates an inference that 
what is omitted was intended to be omitted.273  The OGS supersession 
clause “shall not supersede local government jurisdiction over local 
roads or the rights of local governments under the real property tax 
law.”274  The clause represents “clear and explicit authority” against 
any form of preemption or unreasonable limitation on the 
municipality’s authority to adopt laws relating to local roads and 
property taxes.275  Local roads and property taxes are among the 
enumerated powers granted to local governments under the Statute 
of Local Governments and the Municipal Home Rule Law.276  Had 
the Legislature intended to carve out a municipality’s ability to use its 
zoning powers to dictate whether and where drilling may occur, it 
could have done so, similar to the carve-out for local roads and 
property taxes.  The fact that they did not do so may suggest that 
courts will interpret the supersession clause to preclude the 
municipality from now claiming such authority.277 
 
 271. See generally, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 
N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 
N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987); see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 
186 (N.Y. 2001). 
 272. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt, 664 N.E.2d at 1234; Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922. 
 273. See supra notes 153–55. 
 274. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2012). 
 275. See In re Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1982) (citing Robin v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, 285 N.E.2d 285, 287–88 (N.Y. 
1972)), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).  An example of a reasonable 
limitation is requiring that a local law adopted on the premise of regulating local 
roads be reasonably related to such regulation. Id.  Imposing local compliance fees on 
well pads due to the pressure put on local roads by oil and gas industry trucks is 
unreasonable. Id. 
 276. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2012); N.Y. STAT. LOC. GOV’TS 
§ 10 (McKinney 2012). 
 277. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2012); Weingarten v. Bd. of Trs. of 
N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 2002) (“[W]here the 
Legislature lists exceptions in a statute, items not specifically referenced are deemed 
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There is evidence in OGS as a whole and the legislative history that 
the legislative intent was to preempt all local regulation.  For direct 
conflict analysis, the statute’s comprehensiveness and history are 
indicative of the local role, if any, in regulation.278  OGS requires a 
certain distance of separation between a well pad and bodies of 
water.279  Thereby, OGS, and thus the DEC, regulate permissible and 
impermissible land uses in the field and oil and gas activity.  Similarly, 
zoning ordinances establish permissible and impermissible land 
uses.280  OGS and zoning ordinances regulate permissible land uses. 
However, the fact that OGS touches upon permissible land uses is 
not dispositive as to local zoning authority.  DJL Restaurant held that 
the purpose of the Alcohol Beverage Control Law was to “promote 
temperance in the consumption of alcoholic beverages” and not to 
regulate land use, notwithstanding limits imposed by the law on the 
location of bars and adult entertainment liquor establishments.281  
With regard to the removal of local zoning authority, Daytop Village 
held the statute must provide clear intent to divest such authority.282  
Under the rules of statutory construction,283 there may be intent to 
relinquish local zoning authority, but the purpose of OGS is not to 
regulate land use.  The policy aims are to develop New York’s natural 
resources, prevent waste, and protect landowners’ rights.284  As 
MLRL contained similar policy statements seeking to develop natural 
resources and the courts still upheld local zoning ordinances, courts 
will also likely distinguish between OGS’s purpose and the purpose of 
general land use regulations.285 
 
to have been intentionally excluded.”); Jewish Home & Infirmary of Rochester, N.Y., 
Inc. v. Comm’r of N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 640 N.E.2d 125, 128 (N.Y. 1994). 
 278. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226 
(N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 
1987). 
 279. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0501 (McKinney 2012) 
 280. See, e.g., Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922; Young v. City of Binghamton, 447 
N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1024 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Town of Fenton v. Tedino, 356 N.Y.S.2d 
397, 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). 
 281. See DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 191 (N.Y. 2001). 
 282. Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 931 (N.Y. 1991). 
 283. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 N.E.2d 
174, 178–79 (N.Y. 2002); Jewish Home & Infirmary of Rochester, N.Y., Inc. v. 
Comm’r of N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 640 N.E.2d 125, 129 (N.Y. 1994) (expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius). 
 284. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2012). 
 285. See, e.g., DJL Rest., 749 N.E.2d 191; Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of 
Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234–35 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. 
Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 1987). 
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If a reviewing court were to find the interpretation of MLRL 
analogous to the OGS, then the court would uphold local zoning 
authority.  As a result, any community would have the power to bar 
fracking within its jurisdiction and thereby limit New York’s tax 
revenue opportunities from profits made on energy exploration and 
development.  Depending on the number of communities that choose 
to prohibit local fracking, the New York government may lose control 
over energy policy and lose the ability to adopt a comprehensive plan 
for statewide energy production and use.  Such an interpretation, 
however, would also create more leverage for local communities that 
desire access to scientific studies of the impact of fracking on public 
welfare. 
B. Constitutional Analysis 
Article IX of the New York State Constitution stipulates that any 
infringement on the part of the state government on local authority 
over “property, affairs or government” will not have the force of law 
unless enacted under the re-enactment procedure.286  Ambiguity 
surrounding the phrase “property, affairs or government” of local 
government, as opposed to the property and affairs of state 
government, led to the adoption of Chief Justice Cardozo’s 
“substantial state concern” test.287  Cardozo found state concern 
particularly prevalent in situations involving public safety and welfare 
where the local government chose not to regulate.288  Later court 
decisions in the context of a more integrated State became less 
reticent to find matters of “substantial state concern.”289  However, 
Cardozo also raised several situations wherein it is not likely a court 
would find “substantial state concern” and thus would hold the 
matter to be exclusively within the city or town’s discretion: namely, 
where such a change would drastically affect local population or 
degrade the infrastructure of the locality.290  Moreover, even where 
the State has chosen to regulate, “[t]he [zoning] power is left intact, 
 
 286. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(i). 
 287. See Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713–14 (N.Y. 1929); see also City of New 
York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of N.Y., 676 N.E.2d 847, 851–52 (N.Y. 
1996); Hyman, supra note 209. 
 288. See Adler, 167 N.E. at 712. 
 289. See, e.g., Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 582–83 (N.Y. 1977); 
Floyd v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 300 N.E.2d 704, 705–06 (N.Y. 1973). 
 290. See Adler, 167 N.E. at 712. 
HOOKER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:26 PM 
2012] ZONING OUT FRACKING 907 
except for the declaration of a minimum below which restriction may 
not fall.”291 
Here, OGS has set a standard for all gas development activity 
within the state.  The Legislature has proclaimed that developing 
New York’s natural resources while preserving the environment is a 
state concern.292  The distinction between a matter of local concern 
and one of state concern lies in the scope of its impact.  Noting the 
policy goal of OGS and the technical expertise of the state agency 
endowed with regulatory authority, removing the regulations put in 
place to preserve the environment will conflict with a matter of state 
concern: the preservation of the environment across town, county, 
and city borders.  Environmental standards are particularly necessary 
where the regulated activity could potentially pollute a region much 
larger than a city, as in the case of fracking.293 
Intermingled with matters of state concern are matters of local 
concern.  Though the premise for local concern and local governance 
is Article IX of the New York Constitution, disputes over state and 
local regulatory territory are regularly decided by a balancing of 
statutory interests per the Municipal Home Rule Law and the state 
statute at issue.294  By invoking statutory law, courts avoid invalidating 
a statute that conflicts with a constitutional mandate.  As a result, the 
concept of local concern has developed not only through the 
constitution, but also through statutes.  Notably, the power to adopt 
local zoning ordinances in step with a local development plan that 
protects local public welfare is among the matters of local concern.295  
Preservation of the local public welfare, associated with greater 
regulation, is a matter of local concern and therefore a municipality 
would be within its constitutional power to enhance state-imposed 
regulations.  Therefore, in the case of OGS, the municipality would 
maintain the authority to adopt zoning ordinances, as the state did 
not adhere to the constitution’s re-enactment procedure. 
 
 291. Id. at 711–12. 
 292. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2012). 
 293. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 294. See, e.g., People v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1223 (N.Y. 1982) 
(requiring a broad reading of the Municipal Home Rule Law); Monroe-Livingston 
Sanitary Landfill v. Town of Caledonia, 417 N.E.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. 1980). 
 295. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(i); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263 (McKinney 2012); see 
also N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d at 1223–24; Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 
341 N.E.2d 236, 242–43 (N.Y. 1975); Udell v. Hass, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901–02 (N.Y. 
1968). 
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If municipalities are not granted the authority to restrict the 
physical location of gas wells and courts interpret the OGS to 
preempt local regulation, then local communities will have limited 
leverage to negotiate with gas drilling companies.  Instead, the DEC 
will decide the physical location of gas wells.  Landowners may 
choose not to sell, but neighboring landowners could sell their land or 
mineral rights to their land.  As stated above, there is a risk of public 
drinking water contamination in communities where natural gas wells 
are fracked.296 
On the other hand, if municipalities are granted such authority, 
then municipalities that are even generally in favor of drilling are left 
either wholeheartedly accepting gas drilling and the state regulations 
that come with it, or banning local gas drilling.  A ruling that gives 
municipalities the power to voice their concerns only through 
prohibiting the activity, however, does not create a zero-sum game.  
Instead, simply giving local government a seat at the table in 
constructing safe regulations, and raising key local issues may 
adequately address the interest in giving the municipality a strong 
voice in whether gas development and its economic benefits develops 
in New York.  Though local authorities are presently hardly equipped 
to deal with enforcing regulations, the DEC is heavily understaffed to 
the point that any state regulations could not be effectively 
enforced.297  In such an economic crunch, local governments may 
provide some insight and boots on the ground to help enforce the 
DEC’s regulations. 
III.  INCREASING PUBLIC WELFARE ONE ZONING ORDINANCE 
AT A TIME 
A. Preemption Analysis Should Not Apply 
So far, three court decisions reviewing local ordinances limiting or 
banning fracking have applied preemption analysis.298  Besides noting 
that local governance is expressly preserved in the constitution, none 
of the decisions have applied the express language in the constitution 
 
 296. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 297. See, e.g., Allison Sickle, New York DEC Staff Shorthanded to Reply to 14,000 
Marcellus Shale Comments—Environmental Inspectors Down to 16, D.C. BUREAU 
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.dcbureau.org/20100429137/natural-resources-news-
service/new-york-dec-staff-shorthanded-to-reply-to-13500-marcellus-shale-
comments-environmental-inspectors-down-to-16.html. 
 298. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text. 
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for reconciling state laws that infringe on local governance.299  
Although case law has narrowed the meaning of Article IX’s re-
enactment provision,300 the courts have not completely discarded 
Article IX.  To apply the law as written, the courts must invoke 
Article IX where a conflict arises between a local ordinance and a 
state statute.301 
Even so, the two most recent cases have made clear that the OGS 
is significantly analogous to the MLRL such that a reviewing court 
will most likely uphold a local ordinance banning fracking under 
preemption analysis.302  Although this Note argues for a reviewing 
court to uphold local ordinances that prohibit fracking on 
constitutional grounds, it is likely that courts will continue along this 
line of decisions so long as it is unnecessary to invoke the constitution 
to uphold local authority over local governance. 
B. Applying the Constitution 
Article IX of the New York State Constitution requires a realm of 
local authority to exist.  The manner in which a local government 
chooses to use its land is recognized in Article IX and in subsequent 
cases as integral to local governance.  To remain faithful to the 
constitution and its policy of preserving local governance, courts 
ruling on the validity of local zoning ordinances banning local 
fracking should uphold the zoning ordinances. 
Article 23 of the ECL authorizes and governs oil and gas 
development in New York.  In doing so, it sets forth the purpose and 
policy objectives of the State; namely, preventing waste, promoting 
recovery of the resource, and protecting the correlative rights of the 
landowner.303  Consistent with this statutory directive, Article 23 
provides a detailed statutory framework with exacting requirements 
concerning the location and size of drilling units and the location of 
well pads.304  These requirements reflect the need to site wells based 
upon geology and environmental considerations.  Once an express 
intent to carve out an area for local regulatory action is found, 
however, the court will not find OGS’s detailed statutory framework 
informative. 
 
 299. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 303. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2012). 
 304. See id. § 23-0501. 
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The uniform application of statewide regulations ensures that the 
OGS’s resource development and efficient recovery policy objectives 
will be achieved.305  A contrary interpretation would inhibit this 
objective by prohibiting what the State allows and promotes; namely, 
oil and gas development.  As such, any suggestion that municipalities 
can regulate the location of oil and gas wells or exclude oil and gas 
extraction, exploration, or development in any portion of a 
municipality based upon zoning principles frustrates the policy aims 
of the OGS’s statutory scheme. 
The policy reasons favoring comprehensive centralized regulation 
generally have not outweighed the local government’s interest in the 
public welfare.  Citing precedent established in cases interpreting the 
MLRL’s supersession clause, the court should find OGS created a 
similar carve-out for local land use regulations that do not impinge on 
the State’s express authority to regulate gas development activities.  
The Court in Gernatt Asphalt and Frew Run held that where the 
State expressly claims authority to regulate all that “relates” to a 
subject matter, the State has not preempted local regulation of land 
use generally.306  The similarity between the OGS and the MLRL 
supersession clauses favors upholding local zoning power. 
Applying the Municipal Home Rule Law and supersession 
authority essentially allows the courts to avoid imposing a 
complicated and unusual procedure on the State Legislature.  Like 
the constitution, the Municipal Home Rule Law provides for local 
government authority over “local property, affairs, or government.”  
It makes no mention, however, of the re-enactment procedure.  
Therefore, courts have been less hesitant to invoke supersession 
authority, since it will not place too high a hurdle on state regulation 
of local matters of general concern.  Furthermore, since the Municipal 
Home Rule Law is only a statute, and not a constitutional provision, 
the courts have more discretion to choose how to find a balance 
between state and local power based on the tools of statutory 
construction the court decides to apply when reading the statute.  The 
constitution would always trump a state statute where it applies. 
By applying Article IX of the constitution, however, the court will 
establish a clear distinction between local and state power, and 
 
 305. See id. § 23-0303(2). 
 306. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 
1234 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 
922-23 (N.Y. 1987); see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 
191 (N.Y. 2001). 
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promote state-local cooperation in formulating regulations that may 
severely impact the development of a local community.  In the case of 
fracking, multiple incidents have already occurred in New York and 
neighboring states involving threats to water safety as a result of 
drilling and disposing of wastewater.307  In Adler, Cardozo finds 
disturbing a situation where the State government may decide to 
“throw open Murray Hill to industry and trade” without seeking the 
approval of the New York City government.308  Permitting fracking 
based on State government approval alone would similarly throw 
open town and city centers to fracking. 
Cardozo’s exception for local zoning standards that are higher than 
the standards set forth by the State government entity—in this case 
the DEC—solves just as many problems as it creates.  Having 
unpredictably wavered between treating Article IX § 2 as a repository 
for state power and a provision with some, though limited, meaning, 
establishing Cardozo’s exception as a bright line rule clearly has the 
benefits of predictability and potentially adheres more to the 
intended meaning of the provision.  On the other hand, by only 
permitting the municipality to increase the standards set by the State 
entity, the court would not just be interpreting the law, it would be 
making a policy choice, or alternatively, limiting the policy choices 
available to the municipality. 
With regards to OGS, the Legislature directed the DEC to 
consider both the importance of energy development for the State 
and environmental concerns.309  Presumably, the former consideration 
tends in favor of fewer restrictions on the land available to use for gas 
drilling and the latter consideration tends in favor of more 
restrictions.  Clearly, if local government power consists only of the 
ability to enact restrictions then the municipality would weigh in favor 
of environmental considerations, but would be precluded from 
expressing its preference for energy development considerations. 
Though this result may appear unfair, it does properly reflect the 
state-local dynamic.  If a municipality were to lower the restrictions 
imposed on gas development activity, then it may increase the 
likelihood of drinking water contamination or air pollution, among 
other concerns.  As evidenced by the spread of fracking wastewater in 
the Niagara River near Buffalo, and the rise in methane levels in 
 
 307. See supra notes 1, 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 308. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 712 (N.Y. 1929). 
 309. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303 (McKinney 2012). 
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water-wells near fracking activities, less regulation can harm 
neighboring localities.310  Therefore, Cardozo’s exception tends 
toward preventing municipalities from harming neighboring 
communities, while also preserving some form of local authority over 
local regulation.  In effect, a municipality’s choice may only cause 
slight harm in the form of decreased state tax revenue to neighboring 
municipalities. 
Additionally, courts may find legislative intent in the Municipal 
Home Rule Law for local governments to have power to increase 
restrictions.  When applying the Municipal Home Rule Law, courts 
also found that permitting the local government to increase 
restrictions was inherently inconsistent with state intent, yet still held 
this to be a permissible manner in which to read the statute and 
balance state and local power.311  Therefore, courts, in the same 
manner as Cardozo in Adler, have not taken issue with bias in favor 
of more restriction.  The consequences of not accepting such a bias 
would be to eliminate the supersession authority of local governments 
to act in limited arenas.  Though courts have been extremely hesitant 
to find for the local governments to be endowed with constitutional 
authority, they have actively interpreted the Municipal Home Rule 
Law to protect some form of local regulation. 
Certainly, if the courts rule that the OGS supersession clause 
upholds local zoning ordinances that do not infringe on the state’s 
regulation of gas development activities or that municipalities retain 
authority under the New York Constitution to set stricter zoning 
standards than those set by the state, then the DEC will have to 
rethink its regulations.  Particularly, due to significant environmental 
concerns voiced during the 2011 notice and comment period for the 
DEC’s final regulations as to gas drilling,312 and the resultant 
prohibition of fracking or gas drilling in a number of towns where 
state regulations would otherwise permit fracking, the DEC, and 
potentially the legislature, may have to listen to local concerns. 
Negotiation may increase the costs of regulating gas development 
as the DEC must confer with local interests prior to regulation, but 
these costs will not necessarily outweigh the benefits of energy 
security and higher employment.  Especially in the case of fracking, 
where neither federal nor state regulators have required the full 
 
 310. Hart, supra note 28. 
 311. See DJL Rest. Corp., 749 N.E.2d at 191; Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., 
Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 929–30 (N.Y. 1991). 
 312. See DeWitt, supra note 63. 
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disclosure of the materials used in fracking fluid, a slight increase in 
transaction costs due to negotiation between state and local 
governments is acceptable. 
However, relying solely on the division between regulations related 
to gas development and those related to land use is a tight rope to 
walk.  To ensure Article IX of the constitution and the division 
between state and local authority is preserved, courts should not 
continue to narrow local zoning authority or only maintain it through 
often unpredictable applications of preemption analysis.  Instead, 
echoing Cardozo’s Adler concurrence, courts should uphold local 
zoning authority as among the local powers that may only be 
impaired by adherence to the constitution’s re-enactment procedure.  
Thereby, each piece of state legislation that infringes on a local 
government’s “property, affairs or government” will only preempt the 
local ordinance if the state law passed the New York State 
Legislature twice and was signed by the Governor twice in successive 
sessions.313 
The local ordinance would be upheld under Article IX.  The New 
York State Legislature passed the OGS once in 1971.314  Under 
Article IX, the OGS would therefore not preempt a local ordinance 
prohibiting the use of fracking because the OGS was only passed 
once.  Further, invoking Cardozo, “the subject . . . [is] in a substantial 
degree a matter of State concern,”315 for which the local ordinance 
will have established a higher standard of public safety.316  Therefore, 
without adhering to the re-enactment procedure outlined in Article 
IX, the OGS should not preempt a local ordinance prohibiting local 
fracking. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts examining this issue should uphold local zoning ordinances 
banning fracking within their towns’ jurisdictions.  The three lower 
court decisions that have reviewed the application of OGS have 
applied state preemption analysis.317  In two of these cases, the court 
upheld the zoning ordinance banning fracking within the respective 
town’s jurisdiction.318  If a reviewing court were to find that OGS 
 
 313. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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intended to regulate the entire field of natural gas drilling, the court 
should still uphold the zoning ordinance under the New York 
Constitution.  New York’s Constitution clearly requires re-enactment 
of any state law contravening local governance, and land use and 
zoning is a recognized area of local governance.319  Echoing Justice 
Cardozo’s opinion, local governments did not surrender their 
authority over local governance in the constitution and they should 
not be required to surrender this authority where they act on behalf 
of public safety or public welfare.320 
 
 
 319. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
